Therefore, unlike investors with claim rights, investors with piggyback rights are unable to control the timing of an IPO or other liquidity event. These investors are also generally treated as lower priority investors with application rights. Lower priority means that in a situation where not all shares can be sold through an IPO, investors with piggyback rights may not be able to exercise those rights.  Even registered shares to the public cannot be freely resold; The privilege of investors holding non-registered shares of a public limited company to “drip” shares under Rule 144 is limited by the provisions of that rule and may be further restricted by “withholding” imposed by syndicated banks, nasd and/or state securities regulators. Registration fees can be divided into two categories: “application” and “piggyback”. Piggyback rights, as the name suggests, give shareholders the right to include their shares in a listing that the company currently provides for itself (a “primary” offer) or other shareholders (a “secondary” offer).  The rights of claim, as the name suggests, stipulate that the Company must initiate and continue the registration of an offer, including, but not limited to, the shares offered by the applicant shareholder(s). Since application rights are more controversial, the following discussion focuses primarily (but not exclusively) on this variety. According to the Federal Securities Act, a registration statement is a prerequisite for offering securities. The Company files this statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The registration statement contains information about the company, its business model, its management structure and its planned security offer. This includes all registration fee agreements.
After all, including own shares in a publicly subscribed offer is not the only way to sell shares. A holder of restricted securities may sell his shares, albeit at a discount due to illiquidity, in a private transaction; More importantly, it can “drain” shares into the market once the company has gone public under Rule 144. The registration fees of the holder of restricted shares of an already listed company are therefore excluded, unless the holder wishes to sell before the expiry of the holding period prescribed in Rule 144 or the block is so large that it cannot be “dribbled” under the “volume” or “mode of sale” restrictions provided for in that rule. The “points” in a negotiation on the registration law (points are a slang term for contentious subjects)  are of varying intensity. Some are standard. As a result, the issuer rarely agrees to register convertible preferred shares, convertible debentures or other rights to purchase common shares. The hybrid securities market itself can be chaotic and confusing for analysts of an issuer`s IPO in the emerging phase; In fact, the mere existence of a class of senior securities may cloud the prospects for common shares to participate in future earnings.  Therefore, convertible bondholders must convert before they can include their shares in the offer and/or, in any event, convert them in order to “cleanse” the balance sheet. Some “points”, on the other hand, are potential battlefields.
For example, a minority shareholder would like to have the right to threaten his choice to exercise his rights at any time (and thus force the company to register). The company will struggle to limit the allowable timing of shareholder choice – no less than, say, five and no more than seven years after making its investment. The shareholder will want to be able to transfer his registration rights when transferring his shares – they are part of the set of rights for which he has negotiated. The company will fight to keep the rights of the owner personal – a right to force registration is a formidable weapon if the timing is completely inappropriate. A disgruntled shareholder – for example, a founder who was recently removed as chairman – can swing the rights like a club to get a disjointed concession. The second interesting feature of the registration fee agreement is that it is a tripartite agreement, but only two of the three parties negotiate and sign it. With one small exception for “self-described offers”, a primary or secondary offer of securities requires an issuer to sell shareholders and an underwriter on a “fixed” or “best effort” basis. However, the subscriber is usually not present when signing the registration fee agreement, and the parties themselves must anticipate what the subscriber will need. As a result of this point, underwriters generally do not prefer secondary offers for early-stage companies. Piggyback rights allow an investor to sell his shares after an IPO in “piggybacking” the claim rights of other investors. In other words, investors with piggyback rights only have to rely on investors with claim rights to exercise those claim rights.  Rule 415 of Law 33, adopted in November 1983, allows off-the-shelf recordings subject to subscription, i.e.
the registration of shares for subsequent sale at the option of the holder for (1) mature public limited companies and (2) for secondary issues. .